In some ways today's escalation of violence in Yemen was written on the wall since 2011.
Heralded as the success story of the Arab Spring due to the negotiated and peaceful removal of ex-President Ali Abdullah Saleh, Yemen was seen as a potential blueprint for the resolution of the Syrian conflict. The deal brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council between Saleh and elite strongmen and which supposedly included the forces that started the rebellion was meant to provide for a negotiated re-building of the Yemeni state.
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| Sana'a's Souq market at night- by Ingo Bernhardt http://bit.ly/1bwXgEq |
At the time, most well informed observers pointed out that the deal was hollow, reached without much consultation with forces outside the ancien regime and only paying lip-service to inclusion and the desire for change. In other words the GCC deal artificially extended the life of the ancien regime by leaving intact the neo-patrimonial networks that were the backbone of Saleh's rule and of the Yemeni state. [1]
Everything changes…
However, not everything remained the same. Saleh's well crafted networks have been under strain for years partly due to the depletion of Yemen's oil resources which in essence funded the networks. Another significant factor that put strain on the neo-patrimonial system was the issue of succession which surfaced in the early 2000s when it appeared that Saleh was grooming his son, Ahmed Ali, for the presidency. [2]
It was obvious that Saleh's ability to 'dance on the heads of snakes', as he put it was finally failing him or that the 'snakes' multiplied to an unmanageable extend. Indeed, though Saleh has been extremely cunning in manipulating both the internal situation and attracting Western support for his regime, 2000 seems to have marked the point of no return for him.
In parallel to internal strife and pressures within the regime, the finalisation of the Yemeni-Saudi border in 2001 bred discontent in the Northern Sa'dah province leading to the creation of the Houthi movement, a movement which partly has its roots in Yemen's last (Shia) Zaydi Imamate. Around the same time in the South, the secessionist movement Al-Hirak started picking pace from 2007. Finally, from 2009 the Al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula made its home in Yemen's southern provinces.
Following the 2011 rebellion the possibility of a renewed popular uprising against Saleh's successor Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi was ever-present. In addition, the revolution gave the Houthis an opportunity to extend their rule in Sa'dah and another three governorates while the AQAP was able to take over four cities in Abyan province.
…and it remains the same.
It is therefore obvious that much changed within Yemen before and during the rebellion. What did not changed significantly were the attitudes and actions of regional and international players.
The GCC deal, and the substantive outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference signalled not only the continuation of the ancien regime and its rigid attitudes but also that the policy of Yemen's most important neighbour, Saudi Arabia, remained unchanged.
The Saudis have famously been weary of Yemeni politics since the institution of the Saudi state when Kind Abdullaziz, Saudi Arabia's first monarch, told his sons that everything good and evil for them would come from Yemen. Since then, the Saudis have pursued a policy of funding different power centres in the country, through neo-patrimonial networks, to avoid the concentration of power in the hands of the state. The GCC deal signalled the Saudis’ acquiescence to the continuation of 'business as usual' in Yemen. However, as we saw above, nothing was 'as usual' in 2011.
Another important player worth mentioning is the United States which has been using drones to strike AQAP targets in Yemen for years. These actions, invariably supported by Hadi, have exacerbated tensions and discontent. Embarrassingly, President Obama hailed Yemen as a counter-terrorism success story a few months ago.
The perfect storm: Sana’a March 2015
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| Sana'a, photograph by Rod Waddington http://bit.ly/1Iyb8ZY |
Following last week's horrific attack on two Shia mosques in Sana'a many have been quick to claim that the rising violence in Yemen is a symptom of a sectarian conflict primarily between the (Shia) Houthis and the Sunni AQAP. As the preceding discussion reveals, the situation is far more complicated than that. Indeed, using 'sectarianism' as an explanation of strife and conflict in the Middle East and elsewhere indicates a lack of familiarity and understanding common among some Western commentators.
The preceding events created a perfect storm of discontent in Yemen. With the government in Sana'a weak, partly due to the machinations of Saleh who was allowed to remain in the country and head its most popular party, the Houthis, with some Iranian help, consolidated their hold in the North and marched on Sana’a, taking over on 21 September 2014, putting Hadi under house arrest and eventually leading to his exile in Aden. In the South discontent rose again with calls of secession intensifying.
The Saudis, fearful of the apparent increase of Iranian influence in Yemen, described as a significant victory for Iran in the regional Cold War, have now resorted to bombing Sana'a, one of the world's oldest capitals and the capital of the Middle East's poorest state. The Americans and British have evacuated their diplomats while the former are providing logistical and intelligence support to the Saudi and Jordanian strikes.
The next step
Commentators on social media and beyond have speculated widely as to the outcome of the latest escalation. Some argue for a negotiated resolution brokered by Oman. Others fear that Yemen will be the next fatality in the proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran manifested, so far, in Iraq and Syria. Speculation is rife about the whereabouts of Hadi, his next move and who will be the winner in the internal chessboard between him, the Houthis and Saleh and his son Ahmed Ali.
What is certain is that any solution, if one is found, that does not address the internal pathologies of the Yemeni state and their external sources is bound to fail in the long term. The entanglements of the Yemeni elite, and the Houthis with Saudi, Iranian, American and other interests together with the remarkable lack of prudence evident in 2011, make it unlikely that these pathologies will be addressed.
On the other hand, one may argue that the disastrous turn of events today may force key players to rethink their positions. However, such a re-evaluation will also depend on how high the stakes are for these players. Arguably, the stakes are not yet high enough.
Finally a word of caution, in Yemen, and beyond, the adoption of one-size-fits-all solutions by international players should be avoided at all costs. Arguably today’s strikes are an indication of such an attitude by the Saudi’s and especially the Americans, signalling that they presume that Yemen’s problems will only be solved by outside intervention.
If any solution is reached it should address Yemen’s idiosyncrasies, its society, economy and power structure. Most importantly, in the hoopla of elite politics we should beware of loosing track of Yemen’s citizens who are the real losers in this convoluted interplay of past and present
and local, regional and global politics.
References:
[1]For analysis see: Longley, April , 'The Rules of the Games: Unpacking Patronage Politics in Yemen', Middle East Journal, vol.64, no.3 (summer 2010), pp.385-409.; Dingli, Sophia. 'Is the failed State thesis analytically useful? The Case of Yemen', Politics, vol. 33, no.2 (June 2013), pp.91-100; Phillips, Sarah, Yemen and the Politics of Permanent Crisis (London: The international institute of Strategic Studies).
[2] Hill, Ginny, Peter Salisbury, Léonie Northedge and Jane Kinninmont. 'Yemen: Corruption, Capital Flight and International Drivers of Conflict, Chatham House Report, September 2013.
